Chip designers outsource chip fabrication to external foundries, but at the risk of IP theft. Logic locking, a promising solution to mitigate this threat, adds extra logic gates (key gates) and inputs (key bits) to the chip so that it functions correctly only when the correct key, known only to the designer but not the foundry, is applied. In this paper, we identify a new vulnerability in all existing logic locking schemes. Prior attacks on logic locking have assumed that, in addition to the design of the locked chip, the attacker has access to a working copy of the chip. Our attack does not require a working copy and yet we successfully recover a significant fraction of key bits from the design of the locked chip only. Empirically, we demonstrate the success of our attack on eight large benchmark circuits from a benchmark suite that has been tailored specifically for logic synthesis research, for two different logic locking schemes. Then, to address this vulnerability, we initiate the study of provably secure logic locking mechanisms. We formalize, for the first time to our knowledge, a precise notion of security for logic locking. We establish that any locking procedure that is secure under our definition is guaranteed to counter our desynthesis attack, and all other such known attacks. We then devise a new logic locking procedure, Meerkat, that guarantees that the locked chip reveals no information about the key or the designer's intended functionality. A main insight behind Meerkat is that canonical representations of boolean functionality via Reduced Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams (ROBDDs) can be leveraged effectively to provide security. We analyze Meerkat with regards to its security properties and the overhead it incurs. As such, our work is a contribution to both the foundations and practice of securing digital ICs.
Introduction
The cost of setting up a semiconductor foundry has been increasing with technology scaling, and is currently upwards of $5 billion [42] for cutting-edge fabrication. As a result, many semiconductor design companies have adopted the fabless model (foundries are also referred to as a fabs), i.e., they outsource integrated circuit (IC) fabrication to one of a few large commercial semiconductor foundries, often located offshore. As per a recent study [30] , four out of the top five semiconductor foundries by volume are located outside the United States. Most other countries either do not have a commercial foundry on-shore, and others that do only have access to low-end manufacturing technology.
The fabless model comes with the risk of compromising the designer's intellectual property (IP), i.e., the chip's design details. When a designer outsources a chip for manufacturing, the foundry obtains full access to the chip's layout (effectively a blue-print of the chip), from which it can recover its netlist (a network of interconnected Boolean logic gates) and, as a result, its Boolean functionality [34] . The foundry can then sell the designer's IP to its competitors. If the chip implements proprietary protocols or algorithms the designer stands to lose her competitive advantage. In addition, the foundry can also manufacture and sell extra copies of the chip in the black market. For these reasons, the risk of IP theft has become a serious concern both for commercial IC design companies, as well as for state actors like national defense agencies.
Logic locking, a technique first introduced by Roy et al. [29] , is a promising solution to protect the designer's IP from theft by an untrusted foundry 1 . Logic locking works by inserting additional gates, referred to as key gates, in a netlist with side-inputs that are referred to as key bits. The key bits are stored in a key register. The netlist functions as intended only for a certain key (which we call the correct key), and provides incorrect outputs otherwise. The correct key is known to the designer but not to the foundry. The logic locking procedure proposed by Roy et al. inserts XOR/XNOR gates at randomly chosen locations in the netlist, as shown in Figure 1 . Several other logic locking techniques have been subsequently proposed [2, 8, 11, 22, 24, 25, 28] , and are all premised on the same basic idea.
Once a netlist is locked, it is sent to the foundry for fab- The XOR-based logic locking scheme proposed by Roy et al. [29] . Assets in green boxes are assumed to be secure, i.e., known only to the defender. The working chip can be either secure or available to the attacker depending on the threat scenario.
rication. The foundry manufactures the locked netlist and ships manufactured chips to the designer. The designer activates chips by loading the correct key into each chip's key register 2 . To ensure that the correct key cannot be read out by destructive chip imaging, the key register is assumed to be implemented using read-proof memory [10] . Figure 1 depicts Roy et al.'s logic locking scheme, which they refer to as EPIC, with an example (Section 2 has more details on EPIC).
Attacks on logic locking
The security of logic locking is premised on the foundry not knowing the correct key. However, El Massad et al. [12] and Subramanyan et al. [31] have demonstrated that the correct key can be compromised if the foundry obtains a previously manufactured version of the chip from the market that has already been activated by the designer with the correct key. In this attack scenario, the foundry has two assets: (1) a locked netlist; and (2) a working chip, i.e., one activated with the correct key. Note that the foundry cannot directly probe the working chip for the correct key -recall the key is stored in read-proof memory -but can observe the chip's input/output (I/O) functionality. [12] and [31] leverage the chip's I/O functionality to reverse engineer the correct key using SAT-based inference algorithms.
Empirically, these attacks demonstrate that only a relatively small number of I/O observations are required to recover the correct key, even for netlists locked with up to 128 key bits. The proposed attacks are effective against a wide range of logic locking techniques proposed in literature, including those proposed in [29] , [2] , [25] , [28] and [11] .
Our work The existing attacks on logic locking make a strong assumption on the attacker's assets. That is, the attacker is assumed to have access to a working copy of the chip (one that is previously manufactured and activated by the designer). However, in several important use-cases of logic locking, it is impractical for the attacker to obtain such a working copy. For one, a foundry is unlikely to obtain working copies of chips manufactured for non-commercial purposes, for instance chips manufactured for government agencies. These cannot be purchased in the market. Second, even for consumer electronics, a foundry cannot acquire working copies of a chip that is being manufactured for the first time.
In fact, the first manufacturing run is exactly when a designer might be most interested in protecting the chip's IP using logic locking. This leads us to our motivating question: is logic locking secure when the attacker cannot acquire a working copy of the chip? The implicit assumption in literature has been that logic locking is indeed secure under this constrained (but more practical) attack scenario. In fact, Roy et al. explicitly assert this claim in their paper that "[a locked netlist alone] gives no criterion to check for possible [keys]" [29] . Derivative schemes based on Roy et al.'s mechanism, including the ones proposed in [24] and [28] , implicitly inherit Roy et al.'s claim of security.
Paper contributions Our first contribution is to demonstrate that logic locking is less secure than previously thought. Specifically, we refute the assertion in prior work that the the locked netlist alone provides no information about the correct key by demonstrating a new attack that reverse engineers a significant fraction of key bits with access to the locked netlist only, and not a working chip copy, as assumed by prior attacks. Our attack builds on the observation that all existing logic locking mechanisms attempt to lock the chip after synthesis only 3 . As it turns out, information about the intended Boolean functionality is already embedded in the synthesized netlist and can be extracted by our attack. We therefore refer to our attack as a desynthesis attack.
The vulnerability exposed by the desynthesis attack motivates our second contribution: in Section 4.1 we formulate the first formal notion of security for logic locking. Our security notion captures the requirement that the locked netlist not provide any information to the attacker about the correct key (and, correspondingly, the designer's intended functionality).
Finally, we propose Meerkat, a new logic locking mechanism that is provably secure under our notion of security. Instead of treating security as an after-thought, i.e., locking a synthesized netlist, Meerkat is a joint synthesis and logic locking algorithm. Meerkat directly outputs a locked netlist from a behavioural specification of the chip's functionality.
The key idea behind Meerkat is to lock a canonical, reduced-ordered binary decision diagram (ROBDD) representation of the desired Boolean functionality instead of locking a synthesized netlist. Meerkat then synthesizes the locked ROBDD into a locked netlist. The canonical nature of an ROBDD representation allows us to prove that netlists locked with Meerkat do not reveal any information about the correct key. The overheads of Meerkat are moderate, especially in light of the fact that Meerkat is the only logic locking tool that provides formal security guarantees.
Logic Locking Background
To lay the groundwork for our attack and proposed defense mechanism, we begin by describing existing logic locking schemes using the EPIC protocol as an exemplar. Although logic locking is described somewhat informally in prior work, we adopt a more formal treatment of the topic for rigor and clarity.
Preliminaries A (combinational) Boolean function f: X → Y where X = {0, 1} n and Y = {0, 1} m has n inputs and m outputs. The function f can be implemented using a Boolean netlist (or simply, netlist), C = {V C , E C }. C can be seen as a directed acyclic graph in which each vertex corresponds to a Boolean logic gate, one of the n inputs, or one of the m outputs. We can think of C as a function as well, i.e., C: X → Y such that for x ∈ {0, 1} n , C(x) = f (x), where C(x) is the output of the netlist for input x.
For a given Boolean function f : X → Y and a randomly picked r-bit key k * ∈ K = {0, 1} r , logic locking outputs a netlist C lock : X × K → Y such that the following two requirements are satisfied:
1. C lock must agree with f on all inputs when k * (the correct key) is applied, i.e.,
2. C lock must differ from f when a key other than the correct key is applied, i.e., for any key k = k * ,
That is, the netlist can only be unlocked with the correct key. Note that, in theory, this requirement is satisfied even if C lock differs from f on only one input for every incorrect key. In practice, it might be desirable for C lock to be substantially different from f for an incorrect key. Rajendran et al. [24] quantify this property using a metric, referred to as output corruptibility, that measures the average fraction of inputs for which f differs from C lock for any incorrect key. We report Meerkat's output corruptibility in Section 5.
Note that neither of the two requirements above address the security of the correct key itself. Indeed, there is no prior work of which we are aware that articulates a precise notion of security of the correct key in this context (other than an abstract and unproven assertion that the locked netlist does not reveal the correct key). This is one of our main contributions (see Section 4).
The EPIC protocol We now describe the "Ending Piracy of ICs" for logic locking (EPIC) protocol [29] . The first step in EPIC, as in any conventional IC design process, is logic synthesis.
A synthesis tool is a program that takes as input a Boolean function f , and transforms it into a Boolean netlist, C, that implements f . There may exist several netlists that implement the function. Commercial synthesis tools attempt to output a netlist that minimizes metrics such as power, delay and measures of area such as the gate count of the netlist. For example, a synthesis tool that targets only the gate count metric ideally outputs a netlist C that minimizes |V C |. We model the synthesis tool as a function S where S( f ) = C.
EPIC's locking procedure, L E , operates on the synthesized netlist C, and the randomly generated r-bit key k * , to produce a locked netlist C lock . That is,
As we discuss in Section 3, the manner in which the locking procedure L E is composed with the synthesis procedure S introduces a vulnerability.
EPIC's locking procedure can be explained using the example in Figure 1 . The synthesized netlist in the figure is locked with an r = 2 bit key, k * = 10. For each bit of the key, EPIC selects either a wire or an inverter in C depending on the value of the key bit. If the key bit is 0, EPIC selects a wire; otherwise EPIC selects an inverter. The wire or inverter is then replaced with an XOR gate, with the corresponding bit of the key register as one of its inputs. Note that the EPIC protocol adds both XOR and XNOR gates, the latter by complementing the key value for which an inverter and wire are selected.
In our example, as the first bit of the key is 1, EPIC picks an inverter, i.e., the inverter that immediately follows the NAND gate, and replaces the inverter with an XOR. The unconnected input of the XOR gate is driven by the first key bit. As the second key bit is 0, EPIC replaces the wire between the two NOR gates with an XOR driven by the second key bit.
The functionality of the netlist remains unchanged when the correct key is loaded into the key register. In our example, if the correct key k * = 10 is applied, the first XOR gate acts like an inverter while the second XOR gate acts like a wire. Setting any key bit incorrectly causes a wire in the orig-inal netlist to behave as an inverter, or vice-versa. Ideally, this changes the functionality of the netlist, but the authors of EPIC point out some pathological cases in which even incorrect keys result in correct functionality (in effect, because the impact of two or more incorrect key bits cancels out).
Once a netlist has been locked, it is used as the basis for all remaining steps in the design flow, such as gate placement and wire routing. These steps are not pertinent to the security of logic locking and are therefore omitted from Figure 1 , as well as the remainder of our discussions. The final result is a chip layout file that is sent to the foundry for manufacturing. The foundry manufactures the chip and ships the manufactured parts to the designer, who can then activate the chips by loading the correct key into the key register.
We note that like EPIC, all other logic locking schemes in literature [2, 11, 25] first synthesize f to generate a netlist C and then use different procedures to lock C.
Desynthesis Attack
In this section, we describe our new attack, the desynthesis attack, on logic locking. We begin by describing our attack scenario. Unlike previous attacks, we do not assume access to a working copy of the chip (or, in general, to any I/O behavioral information). We then illustrate the vulnerability that our attack exploits using a simple example. Finally, we describe a concrete way that an attacker might make use of the vulnerability.
Attack Scenario
The attacker in our scenario is a foundry that manufactures a locked netlist, C lock . We assume that the foundry, as an attacker, has access to: (a) the locked netlist, C lock , (b) knowledge of which inputs in the netlist are regular inputs and which are key bits, (c) knowledge of the synthesis tool, S, that is used by the designer, and, (d) the locking procedure that is used to generate C lock from C.
With regards to (a), the foundry obtains C lock by reverseengineering it from its layout, using a process called extraction. With regards to (b), the foundry can learn this separately by exploiting implementation artifacts, for example, the key bits are either read from read-proof memory or, in the full EPIC protocol, are outputs of a decryption module. Regular inputs, on the other hand, connect to chip I/O. With regards to (c) and (d), we note that Kerchoffs's principle [21] is relevant in this context. It states that, "a (crypto)system should be secure even if everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge." On (c), however, the designer may have used a closed-source commercial logic synthesis tool. An option then is to weaken the attacker by assuming that she has only black-box access to S by purchasing it from the market. Indeed, our attack (see Section 3) only requires such a weaker attacker to be practical.
However, when considering a defense mechanism (see Section 4), we adopt the stronger attacker that has open access to our locking and synthesis procedures.
When compared to prior work, we assume that the attacker does not have access to an activated and working copy of the chip. We discuss our rationale for this under "our work" in Section 1. We assume also that the attacker (the foundry) does not have any prior information about f . That is, from the foundry's perspective, all different 2 r functions that C lock implements are equally likely.
Attacker's goal. Under the attack scenario above, the attacker's goal is to compromise the correct key k * . Compromise, in this context, means that she discovers several of the key bits. An explicit assertion in prior work (see the quote from Roy et al.'s paper in Section 1) is that with access to C lock only, the attacker can do no better than randomly guessing k * . We show that, unfortunately, existing locking mechanisms fail to provide this property. Meerkat provably addresses this vulnerability.
The Vulnerability
We now illustrate the vulnerability that our attack exploits using the logic locking example design from Figure 1 . The function that the designer wishes to implement is f = (Ā + B).(B +C). The synthesized netlist C corresponds to the lowest area implementation of f using a technology library that comprises two-input NAND, NOR and NOT (inverter) gates.
(In this example, we assume that the synthesis procedure S aims to minimize area, but this is not necessary for our attack to succeed.) As described in Section 2, C is then locked with k * = {1, 0}. Now suppose the attacker wants to check if some key k ∈ K is the correct key. The attacker can determine the Boolean function f k = C lock (., k) that the locked netlist implements with key k. For example, say k = 00. As shown in Figure 2 , the Boolean function corresponding to this key is f 00 = A.B. The attacker can now ask: could the locking procedure applied on f 00 = A.B produce C lock ?
As the first step in EPIC is synthesis, the attacker synthesizes f 00 = A.B. (Recall, from the previous section, that the attacker has at least black-box access to the defender's synthesis procedure). Figure 2 shows the resulting synthesized netlist, C 00 = S( f 00 ).
This netlist only has two gates -a NAND gate and an inverter. Locking this netlist can introduce at most two additional gates; the new gates must be either XOR or XNOR gates. On the other hand, C lock has two NOR gates. There is no way to lock C 00 using the EPIC locking mechanism that would result in C lock . The attacker can therefore eliminate k = 00 as the correct key. Using similar reasoning, the attacker eliminates k = 11 and k = 01 as correct keys.
In the example, the Boolean function that corresponds to k = 01 is f 01 = 0, a wire. And an attacker may use this as a basis for eliminating k = 01 as a possibility, as a wire is unlikely to have been the designer's intent. This is certainly plausible. In our attack that we discuss in the next section, we do not require such a priori knowledge.
Practical challenges The preceding example illustrates the strength of desynthesis attacks, albeit in the idealized setting that the attacker is able to brute-force the key. Implementing this attack in a real-world setting introduces some challenges. (1) An attacker cannot exhaustively search over all keys for large key sizes. And, (2) commercial synthesis tools are imperfect. For the same f , the output of the synthesis tool can depend on the manner in which f is described. Furthermore, existing synthesis tools are heuristic in nature -they do not guarantee an optimal solution, for example, a netlist with the lowest area, delay or power. We now discuss a practical desynthesis attack procedure that addresses these challenges.
Implementation of Desynthesis Attack
We now describe the implementation of our desynthesis attack. The attack aims to find a k that results in a resynthesized netlist, C k = S( f k ), that is the most "similar" to the locked netlist C lock (minus its key gates).
Because an exhaustive search for k * is computationally infeasible, we instead adopt a greedy search heuristic. We start with a random guess for k * , and we iteratively improve upon the guess by exploring the immediate neighborhood of keys that are one Hamming distance away from the current guess. From this set of neighboring keys, we pick the one that results in a re-synthesized netlist most similar to C lock . The iterations terminate when all re-synthesized netlists in the neighborhood of the current guess are less similar to C lock than the re-synthesized netlist corresponding to the current guess. To better explore the key space, we perform the local search multiple times, each time starting with a different initial key guess.
The description so far has assumed a metric to quantify similarity (or, more precisely, dis-similarity) between netlists. Measures of similarity between graphs have been studied widely in literature [13] . However, many of these measures, for instance graph edit-distance, are expensive to compute. We found, empirically, that the following simple measure of dis-similarity, ∆, not only works well in practice but is also easy to compute. Specifically,
where C 1 and C 2 are the two netlists to be compared, {g 1 , . . . , g l } is the set of gate types in the standard cell library 4 , and n G [C] is the number of gates of type G in netlist C.
Algorithm 1 describes our desynthesis attack. In Lines (1)- (2) of the algorithm, we count the number of key bits in C lock , and set abs min, a variable that holds smallest dis-similarity value found so far, to a very large value, and in the "foreach" loop, we perform a local search for the key that minimizes the dis-similarity measure between the re-synthesized netlist and C lock .
Inputs: (1) A locked netlist C lock , and, (2) restarts, the number of restarts for the local search.
Output: A guess for the correct key, k * , that was used to generate C lock .
1 r ← number of key bits in C lock 2 abs min ← ∞ 3 foreach i from 1 to restarts do
abs min ← min 13 return best guess
Algorithm 1: Desynthesis Attack
Effectiveness of desynthesis attack While we defer a comprehensive analysis of the results of our desynthesis attack to Section 5, we plot in Figure 3 the results of our attack on the styr benchmark from the MCNC benchmark set [41] . The benchmark is synthesized using the ABC synthesis tool, and the netlist is locked using EPIC, with 32-and 64-bit keys. Each histogram shows the number of bits of the correct key that we correctly recover over 100 experiments (we select the correct key and the locations of key gates independently at random in each experiment). Also shown, for comparison, are histograms of the number of key bits that an attacker would correctly guess if indeed the EPIC locking procedure were as secure as claimed (recall that the claim is that the locked netlist provides "no criteria" to guess the key bits). Note that in every experiment, the desynthesis attack recovered more than half the key bits correctly. On average, the desynthesis attack recovers 23 (and up to 29) and 47 (and up to 59) key bits correctly for 32-and 64-bit keys, respectively. Based on these results, it is clear that the locked netlist does indeed leak information about the designer's correct key, pointing to the insecurity of EPIC. In Section 5 we perform statistical hypothesis tests of this assertion against the null hypothesis, i.e., that the key and locked netlist are independent. We also report results on a larger set of benchmark circuits, two different synthesis tools and two different locking procedures.
Provably Secure Logic Locking
We now discuss Meerkat, a new logic synthesis and locking procedure that is provably secure in our attack scenario. We begin by formalizing a notion of security for logic locking and then describe Meerkat, a candidate logic locking procedure that is provably secure under this notion of security.
Formal Notion of Security for Logic Locking
In this section, we describe a formal a notion of security for logic locking under the threat scenario discussed in Section 3.
We re-iterate that, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that a formal security definition has been proposed for logic locking.
To begin, we generalize the definition of a logic locking procedure, L, from Section 2. Recall that L was previously defined to take a synthesized netlist as input, a vulnerability that we exploited in our desynthesis attack. We generalize L to take a Boolean function f as input, along with a designer's chosen key k * . Second, we explicitly model non-determinism in the locking procedure. We say that Pr[L( f , k * ) = C lock ] is the probability that L outputs locked netlist C lock ∈ C lock with inputs f and k * .
We define the notion of security as follows.
A locking procedure L is secure for (family of) function classes {F r } r=1,2,... if the following condition holds for every function f ∈ F r , key k * ∈ {0, 1} r and locked netlist C lock ∈ C lock output by L for inputs f and k * :
where f k = C lock (., k) is the Boolean function that C lock implements for (incorrect) key k. Note that by definition of a locking procedure, f k is necessarily different from f , for all k = k * .
Proposition 1.
If L is a secure locking procedure, then for every function f , key k * and locked netlist C lock ∈ C lock output by L for inputs f and k * :
where f k = C lock (., k) is the Boolean function that C lock implements for key k.
Proof. The proof for when k 1 = k * follows from the definition of a locking procedure. For k 1 = k * , by definition of security, it follows that C lock ∈ L( f k 1 , k 1 ). C lock (., k 2 ) = f k 2 must then be different from f k 1 , again, by definition of a correct locking procedure.
Intuitively, Definition 1 can be understood as follows. A locked netlist C lock implements a family of 2 r different Boolean functions (Proposition 1), i.e., function f k for each key k ∈ K. Definition 1 guarantees that any function f k in that family is as likely to have produced C lock (when f k is locked with key k) as the correct function f = f k * locked with correct key k * . Thus, C lock itself provides no criteria on which to distinguish an incorrect function from the correct one, i.e., it reveals no information about the correct function or the correct key.
Note that in the special case that L is a deterministic procedure, Definition 1 simply says that each function f k when locked with key k ∈ K should yield the same C lock .
The following remarks shed further light on our notion of security.
Remark 1.
A locking procedure that satisfies the security notion in Definition 1 is immune to the de-synthesis attack. As discussed above, any of the functions that C lock implements are equally likely to have produced C lock , providing the attacker no criteria to distinguish between these functions. (Note that immunity to the desynthesis attack is guaranteed even for computationally unbounded attackers.) Remark 2. Our attack scenario (see Section 3) assumes that an attacker has no prior information (equivalently, a prior distribution) on the function, f , that the designer intends to implement. The security notion in Definition 1 does not protect against a (stronger) attacker who has such information, specifically, one who has access to a non-uniform prior distribution on the chip's intended functionality. For the sake of argument, assume that the attacker's prior distribution is concentrated on a single function f -here, the attacker knows in advance exactly the function the designer intends to implement. No locking scheme is secure in this (admittedly extreme) setting. Provably secure logic locking under more general prior distributions on the designer's intended functionality remains an open question.
Remark 3. Implicit in Definition 1 is invariance to the manner in which the function f is described 5 . That is, an attacker cannot exploit prior knowledge about the way in which Boolean functionality is typically described to defeat logic locking procedures that are secure as per Definition 1. In fact, this is a vulnerability that our desynthesis attack exploits -existing logic locking procedures operate on parsimonious descriptions of Boolean functionality, i.e., synthesized netlist. In addition to addressing this vulnerability, our security notion buys immunity against attacks that exploit properties of human-generated code (coding styles, for example).
Meerkat
We now describe Meerkat, the first logic locking scheme that is provably secure as per Definition 1, and therefore guarantees that the locked netlist does not reveal any information about the correct key (see Section 3 for more details on the attack scenario). Central to Meerkat are reduced ordered binary decision diagrams (ROBDDs) -canonical representations of Boolean functionality first introduced in a landmark paper by Bryant [4] . ROBDDs have found wide applicability in several areas of hardware design, particularly in the area 5 The same function f can be described in a multitude of ways, for example as a truth table, a netlist, or behavioral hardware description language (HDL) code. of formal verification [5, 6] , but have now largely been superseded by SAT/SMT solvers in industry. Meerkat revives the use of ROBDDs in the hardware security context. We begin our description of Meerkat with a short ROBDD primer.
An ROBDD Primer
An ROBDD is a special case of a binary decision diagram (BDD), a data structure that allows a Boolean function to be evaluated as essentially a branching program. All but the terminal nodes of a BDD correspond to Boolean variables, and each has two children -a high-child and a low-child. For a given assignment of variables, a function can be evaluated starting from the root, and branching to the high-child if the corresponding variable is 1 and to the low-child otherwise. This continues till a terminal node, either a 0 or a 1 is reached.
Bryant's key observation was that if (a) certain reduction rules are followed to ensure that there are no redundant nodes in a BDD, and (b) variables in any path from root to a terminal node only occur in a fixed order, then the resulting BDD, called an R(educed)O(rdered)BDD, is a canonical representation of Boolean functionality. Importantly, Bryant observed that ROBDD representations for many Boolean functions of practical interest are compact, unlike other canonical representations like truth tables (although ROBDDs can be exponentially sized in the worst case.) As an example, an ROBDD for representing the function f =x 1x2x3 + x 1 x 2 + x 2 x 3 is shown in Figure 4a .
More formally, an ROBDD for function f : X → {0, 1} is a rooted directed acyclic graph, G, with two sets of nodes: a set of decision nodes, D, and two terminal nodes, 0 and 1. The ROBDD has three associated functions. Functions hi : D → D ∪ {0} ∪ {1} and lo : D → D ∪ {0} ∪ {1} return the high-child and low-child of each node, respectively. Function var : D → X returns the variable associated with each node.
Each node d ∈ D implements a Boolean function f d which can be expressed as follows:
The terminal nodes implement f 1 = 1 and f 0 = 0, and the root node implements f .
Meerkat Procedure
We now describe Meerkat's locking procedure. Starting with a behavioral description f , Meerkat first constructs its ROBDD, G. Then, Meerkat locks G with key k * to output an new locked ROBDD, G lock , as follows.
For each bit of the r-bit key, Meerkat picks a node of the ROBDD G uniformly at random. Say for the i th key bit, node d ∈ D is picked. We now add two new key nodes to the G, p i and q i with the following properties:
• var(p i ) = var(q i ) = k * i , that is, the variable corresponding to both nodes is the i th key bit. We will see why this is required shortly. Figure 4b shows the result of locking the ROBDD in Figure 4a with a 2-bit key, k * = 10. Finally, the locked ROBDD, G lock can be synthesized into a netlist C lock using specialized BDD synthesis tools like BDS [40] and FDD [17] . Alternatively, any ROBDD (in fact any BDD) can be implemented using a network of multiplexers (MUXes) by replacing each node with a MUX, as shown in Figure 4c . This MUX-only netlist can then be fed into any standard synthesis tool (for further optimization) and outputs the final locked netlist. The astute reader might wonder if the use of a standard synthesis tool in the back-end compromises security. The answer is no: a striking feature of Meerkat is that it enables any functionality-preserving transformation to be applied on G lock without compromising security at all (more details in Theorem 1).
Security Analysis of Meerkat
We now prove that Meerkat's locking procedure meets the security criterion prescribed in Definition 1. To begin, let G k be the resulting BDD when key k ∈ K is "applied" to G lock , i.e., the key nodes in G lock are eliminated as follows. Let d i be the node that was randomly selected during the i th iteration of the locking procedure (corresponding to the i th bit of the key). For each d i ,
• if k i = k * i , then the high-child (resp. low-child) of d i in G lock is set to the high-child (resp. low-child) of d i in G, else
, then the high-child (resp. low-child) of d i in G lock is set to the low-child (resp. high-child) of d i in G.
That is, the BDD G k can be obtained from ROBDD G by flipping the high and low children of a subset of its vertices.
(If the distinction between edges pointing to high versus low children is ignored, G and G k are isomorphic.)
Note that the BDD G k represents the function f k = C lock (., k) that results when key k is applied to the locked netlist. We now show that: (1) G k is indeed an ROBDD and
Proof. We prove this assertion using induction on the number of key bits. For a single key bit, node d 1 in G is selected and its high-and low-children flipped to yield G k . The highand low-children of d 1 cannot be isomorphic (or G would not be be an ROBDD). Furthermore, as long as d does not have a complementary node in G, no two nodes in G k are isomorphic (or again G would not be an ROBDD). However, if d has a complementary node in d in G, then d and d would be isomorphic in G k and therefore G k would not be an ROBDD. This is illustrated in Figure 5 with an example. However, in this case d would not have been picked in the first place as this is explicitly forbidden in the Meerkat procedure. The inductive step proceeds along similar lines. Here, G k is assumed to Proof. G k is an ROBDD that is distinct from G since at least one node in G has its high and low children swapped. Because ROBDDs are canonical, the corresponding functions f k and f must also be distinct.
Lemma 2 guarantees that applying an incorrect key to the locked netlist results in incorrect functionality. . Note that, for ease of exposition, we have assumed that G has no complementary nodes but the proof easily extends to the more general setting.
For any key k = k * , let G k be the corresponding ROBDD (as per Lemma 1), and f k be the Boolean function that G k represents. As we have seen, for each node in G there is a corresponding node in G k . For all i such that k * i = k i , the highand low-children of node d i ∈ D lock of G and G k are swapped; every other node in G k has the same high-and low-children as in G. Now, when f k is locked with key k, the first step is to construct its ROBDD, which is G k . The set D lock = {d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d r } is picked in iterations 1 through r of the locking procedure with probability
. Finally, for any i for which the high-and low-children children of d i in G k and G are the same (resp. swapped), the key bits k i and k * i are also the same (resp. complementary). As a consequence, locking f k with key k produces G lock with the same probability as locking f with key k * .
The final step in Meerkat is to synthesize G lock to a locked netlist C lock . But since locking f k with key k produces G lock with the same probability as locking f with key k * , the same holds true for the locked netlist C lock (regardless of the synthesis approach used).
Experimental Evaluation and Results
In this section, we report results that demonstrate the effectiveness of our desynthesis attack and the area and delay overheads of Meerkat compared to previously proposed logic locking schemes.
Our results are presented on eight large benchmark netlists from the MCNC benchmark suite [41] , which was specifically tailored for logic synthesis research. All the benchmarks we use are finite-state machines (FSMs) (more specifically, the combinational logic part of the FSMs) taken from real-life industrial chips. Note that the trade secrets of a chip designer are usually in the control units of a chip's design, which are FSM-based [8] .
Desynthesis Attack Results
To test the effectiveness of the desynthesis attack we implemented two logic locking schemes from literature: EPIC [29] and the interference-based locking (IBL) scheme proposed by Rajendran et al. [25] . Both schemes use XOR/XNOR key gates but differ in the way locations to insert key gates are selected. ABC [32] , an academic synthesis tool was used to generate synthesized netlists that are then locked.
Synthesized netlists were locked with r = 32 and r = 64 bit keys. For each logic locking procedure, key size and benchmark combination we generate 100 locked netlists, using different placements of key gates and randomly generated keys. Table 1 presents the results of our desynthesis attack on the eight benchmark circuits. We report the average, minimum and maximum number of bits of the key that we correctly recover over 100 experiments. We also report the average time the attack took on each benchmark.
From the data we can make the following observations. (1) The success of our desynthesis attack is largely independent of the locking procedure used. This is not surprising -neither procedure was designed to protect against the desynthesis attack. (2) Doubling the key size roughly doubles the number of key bits that are correctly recovered -increasing key size does not seem to reduce the effectiveness of our attack. (3) Although the benchmarks vary in terms of characteristics (number of inputs, outputs and gates), the attack results are largely the same across benchmarks. (4) In the best case across benchmarks, locking procedures and 100 runs, we recovered 29 of 32 keys and 59 of 64 keys. The probability of recovering these many bits in 100 runs if indeed the locking schemes were secure (i.e., the key could at best be randomly guessed) is overwhelmingly small.
Although not shown in Table 1 , we conducted statistical hypothesis tests to check whether the distribution of recovered key bits is consistent with a random guess. For every benchmark, locking procedure and for both 32-and 64-bit keys we find a p-value of less than 0.0001, allowing us to reject the null hypothesis. In other words, there is statistically significant evidence to believe that existing locking mechanisms are not secure.
To demonstrate that the desynthesis attack remains effective for a different synthesis tool, we synthesized one of the benchmarks, dk16, using Cadence Encounter RTL Compiler (a commercial synthesis tool), and locked the synthesized netlist using EPIC and a 32-bit key. Figure 6 shows a histogram of the number of correctly guessed key bits over 100 runs versus the histogram for the number of correctly guessed key bits if the attacker were randomly guessing the key. On average, the desynthesis attack recovers 24.5 (and up to 31) keys, which is similar to the attack's success when ABC was used as a synthesis tool. Note that in 3 of the 100 runs, the attack recovered all but one key bit correctly.
Meerkat
We have implemented Meerkat within the ABC synthesis environment (since ABC has an in-built BDD package) along with some glue code. In Figure 7 , we compare the area overhead of logic locking using Meerkat with 32-and 64-bit keys over the original unlocked netlist. We also show the area overhead of EPIC. We observe that the Meerkat overheads grow proportionally with key size and are modestly larger than EPIC overheads. The overheads are obviously lower for larger circuits -Meerkat's overhead for 64 bit key for the largest benchmark is 43%. Figure 8 plots Meerkat's delay overheads. Note that EPIC explicitly recommends keeping key gates off critical paths (paths in the netlist that impact delay) and therefore, ideally, has no delay overhead. On the other hand, we cannot do this in Meerkat because we insert key nodes before synthesis, i.e., before we know where the critical paths are.
While the overheads are greater than those of prior work, we note that Meerkat is the only approach that provides formal security guarantees. Furthermore, as discussed in Section 6, the area and delay overheads can be amortized, and are significantly lower than the those incurred by alternative approaches to trusted fabrication. Finally, Figure 9 compares the output corruptibility (a measure of the average fraction of inputs that result in incorrect outputs for an incorrect key [24] ) of netlists locked with Meerkat versus those locked with EPIC. In some cases, 64-bit keys are required to obtain high output corruptibility using Meerkat.
Limitations and Discussion
Our desynthesis attack reveals a serious vulnerability in existing logic locking schemes. Meerkat, our proposed defense mechanism, is the first provably secure logic locking mechanism. Certainly, our work has limitations, and in this section, we discuss these, and ways of addressing them. We also touch upon the distinction between the related threats of IC over-production and IP theft as they relate to EPIC and this work.
Desynthesis attack In our attack model (see Section 3), we assume that the attacker has access to the designer's locking procedure, including the synthesis tool. A question that arises is, is such an attacker too strong? We first point out that this is justified based on Kerchoffs's principle [21] , which, applied to our context, states that the system needs to be secure under the attacker we consider. Nonetheless, one may ask whether the EPIC procedure can be made more secure if the attacker does not know which synthesis tool the designer uses, or if the designer uses a proprietary synthesis tool. We believe that although this merits further quantitative investigations (for example, the attacker could include the choice of synthesis tool in the search space of the desynthesis attack), we re-assert that the goal of our work is to provide logic locking with provable guarantees on security, which a "securityvia-obscurity" scheme does not provide.
A second possible issue regards the observation that our desynthesis attack, for the cases we tried, does not appear to correctly identify all key bits, but only comes very close in several cases. Prior attacks on logic locking appear to recover all key bits, but, those attacks assume that the attacker can obtain inputs and outputs from a working copy of the chip. Furthermore, we note that our attack can be further strengthened with access to more computational resources. A determined attacker can amplify the results by exploring a larger portion of the key space. It bears mentioning that the turnaround time on chip fabrication can be months; this gives the attacker a significant window of time in which to run desynthesis attacks. Further, it might be useful for an attacker to apply divide and conquer; for instance, by attacking individual logic cones within the netlist. We plan to explore this in future work.
Meerkat Understandably, security, particularly provable security as Meerkat provides, comes at a cost. Meerkat introduces both delay and area overheads. We note however that in most cases, the trade secrets of a designer only comprise a small part of a chip's overall design. The rest of the design consists mostly of static random-access memory (SRAM) (for example, a CPU's cache), which contains no trade secrets. As such, to protect a chip from piracy, a designer can choose, for locking, a small part of the overall design only, thereby significantly amortizing any overhead that is incurred. We locked the instruction decoder of a 32-bit RISC processor [23] using Meerkat and found that the total area of the processor core increased only by 37%.
Still, one might wonder if a designer would be willing to incur such overhead in a highly competitive market, where producing lower-performing chips might put the designer at a disadvantage. To answer this question, we consider three options that are available to the designer: (1) The designer can forgo logic locking altogether, and instead send her IP "in the clear" across design stages. This, of course, exposes the designer's IP to the risk of the theft. (2) The designer can decide to carry out her fabrication at a trusted foundry (for instance, a low-end foundry located on-shore), instead of fabricating the chip at a high-end but untrusted foundry. However, the technology gap between a low-end, on-shore foundry and a high-end off-shore foundry can be significant. As an example, the most advanced technology available in India (an 800nm foundry) is 25 years older and at least 100× worse (in terms of chip area alone) than the state-of-the-art [37] . (3) A third option is for the designer to implement her proprietary designs using reconfigurable logic. Aside from the area overheads of reconfigurable logic (around 35× [16] ), the designer would need to store the configuration bits of the reconfigurable logic in read-proof memory to protect the chip from piracy. In contrast, locking requires far fewer bits to be implemented using read-proof memory.
There are settings, however, in which it may be truly impracticable to lock a design (or even part of a design) using Meerkat. In particular, it is known that ROBDDs for certain types of hardware functions like multipliers and encryption modules are inefficiently sized [39] . In part this is a consequence of the strong security guarantees we aim to provide -invariance to the function representation implied by Definition 1 necessitates the use of a canonical representation.
Yet, Meerkat inherits one of the appealing properties of ROBDDs that has driven their popularity, i.e., they are compact for a large class of Boolean functions of practical interest [3] . An interesting avenue for further research is whether netlist partitioning techniques can be used to mitigate the scalability bottleneck for functions with large ROBDDs, perhaps with some, known, loss in security. Also, we note that the criterion in Definition 1 is a sufficient condition; an open question is whether Definition 1 can be relaxed while still guaranteeing security. We also note that Meerkat can be applied in a LUT-based locking context. The designer could implement parts of the logic that key bits feed into with lookup tables, although this possibly results in a larger key and function space. As the original family of functions is included in the new key space, the security guarantees would remain.
Another point of note relates to the family of functions within which Meerkat embeds the correct function f -we have shown that the 2 r − 1 alternate functions that C lock implements, all have the same ROBDD structure as f with the high and low children of r nodes swapped. Although we have shown in Section 5 that these alternate functions have high output corruptability (output corruptability measures how different two Boolean functions are), it is possible to investigate broader families of functions within which f is embedded, for example functions with ROBDDs of the same size.
Threats: IP theft vs. over-building Logic locking, as a specific instance, has been proposed in two related attack scenarios: (1) over-building of ICs, i.e., when the foundry makes extra, unauthorized copies of the chip, and, (2) IP theft, i.e., reverse engineering the IC's (locked) netlist. Defenses against over-building are referred to as hardware metering [15] . EPIC (and succeeding logic locking schemes) claim to protect against both since the protocol actually has two keys: a key that is common to all chips and is an input to key gates (this is the key we have been concerned with so far), and a unique key for every chip. The unique per-chip key is generated by the designer as follows: upon power-up, a newly fabricated chip generates a random number, using a hardware true random number generator (TRNG). An on-chip RSA key generation circuit then takes this random number, interprets it as a private key, and generates the corresponding public key. The public key is read-out by the foundry and sent to the designer. The designer encrypts the common key using this public key to generate the chip-specific unique key (note that the unique key depends on the TRNG output which is different for every chip). Finally, the unique key is entered into the chip by the foundry, where it gets decrypted by an RSA decryption circuit to its plain form, the common key, that actually unlocks the netlist.
Although the unique key protects against over-building, it offers no protection against IP theft. That is, our attack (and indeed all attacks in prior work [24, 31] ) focus on directly reverse engineering the common key (recall that unlike prior attacks, however, we do not assume access to a working chip). In fact, a compromise of the common key not only reveals the designer's intended netlist (accomplishing IP theft), but also enables the foundry to generate new masks in which the correct key is hardwired into the circuit. The foundry can then mass produce functionally equivalent chips with this new mask, thus effectively over-building the IC. Modifying an existing mask or creating a new one is easily within the realm of capabilities of a foundry.
Related Work
We now discuss prior art on secure outsourced chip fabrication, and place it in the context of our work.
The EPIC protocol [29] was the first locking scheme proposed to protect combinational logic from over-building and IP theft. The EPIC protocol is described in detail in Section 2. Succeeding work has attempted to improve upon the EPIC locking procedure by using programmable logic [2] and MUXes [22, 38] instead of XOR/XNOR gates, and smart selection of locations for key-gate insertion [24, 28] . However, all these techniques assume that locking is performed after synthesis, the root of the vulnerability that we exploit in our desynthesis attack.
In terms of attacks, Maes et al. [20] demonstrated a vulnerability in EPIC using a man-in-the-middle attack on the communication protocol between the foundry and designer, thus enabling the attacker to over-build the IC. Maes et al. [20] also suggest a fix to the protocol to address this vulnerability. Attacks on logic locking that aim to steal the chip's IP have all assumed that an attacker has at least partial access to the chip's I/O functionality. Rajendran et al. [24] show that an attacker who has a working copy of the chip can quickly re-cover the key if the location of key gates is picked at random (as in EPIC). They describe an improved technique to insert key gates that defends against this attack.
However, Rajendran et al.'s improvement to the EPIC procedure was recently defeated by Subramanyan et al. [31] using a sophisticated attack that relies on SAT-based inference. Concurrently, El Massad et al. [12] devised the same attack on IC camouflaging, a conceptually related hardware security mechanism. Liu et al. [19] have proposed techniques to further enhance the effectiveness of SAT-based attacks.
Defending against these sophisticated attacks on logic locking still remains an open problem. Recently, a defense mechanism using MUX-based logic locking was developed for a more restricted attack scenario in which the attacker only has access to a certain number of chip I/O pairs, but not a working chip [22] . However, as we discussed in Section 1, there are important settings in which the attacker has no I/O access. Logic locking has so far been assumed to be secure in this setting. Our attack is the first attack that shows that logic locking is insecure even when the attacker has no I/O access.
A related line of research has been focused on hardware metering and IP theft prevention for sequential logic (FSMs). Alkabani et al. [1] were the first to propose an active metering scheme for FSMs that modifies the FSM such that a certain initial sequence of inputs needs to be applied to unlock the chip. The sequence varies from chip-to-chip and depending on randomness extracted from each chip. However, Alkabani et al. only aim to protect against over-production and not directly against IP theft. Further work in this direction includes schemes that seek to prevent IP theft by locking the (combinational) state-transition function of the FSM [7, 8] . These techniques would also be vulnerable to our desynthesis attack. A recent paper proposes to obfuscate an FSM using structural transformations of the state-transition graph [18] , but these transformations cannot be used in the context of combinational logic locking.
Besides IC locking, another technique that has been proposed in literature for secure outsourced chip fabrication is split maufacturing [14, 27, 35, 36] . The idea is to partition a chip into two (or more) parts and fabricate each part at a separate foundry. However, split manufacturing (a) requires access to technology like like 3D integration [14] or split fabrication [36] that is still experimental, (b) can have high overhead [14] and (c) is susceptible to so-called proximity attacks [27] .
Other techniques to deter hardware IP theft that are orthogonal to our work include watermarking [9] (to detect IP theft) and IC camouflaging [12, 26] (to defend against postfab "sand-and-scan" attacks). As a concluding note, besides IP theft, another risk of outsourced chip fabrication is an untrusted foundry that maliciously modifies the chip. We do not address this threat in our work and refer the reader to an excellent survey paper on this topic [33] .
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a new attack on logic locking that, unlike prior attacks, does not require an attacker to have access to a working copy of the chip. The attack exploits the observation that all existing logic synthesis mechanisms lock synthesized netlists, and that the synthesis step embeds information about the true functionality of the chip into the locked netlist. Using our attack, we were able to correctly recover a significant number of bits, up to 30 and 59 bits, for netlists locked with 32-and 64-bit keys, respectively. To address the vulnerability posed by the attack, we present the first formal notion of security for logic locking and develop Meerkat, a new logic locking technique based on ROBDDs that is provably secure under this notion. Meerkat's area and delay overheads, although greater than those of existing (insecure) techniques like EPIC, are still moderate, particularly in light of the fact that they come with security guarantees.
